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Joint action goals reduce 
visuomotor interference effects 
from a partner’s incongruent 
actions
Sam clarke1*, Luke Mcellin2, Anna francová2, Marcell Székely2, Stephen A. Butterfill3 & 
John Michael2,3
Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically 
incongruent actions of their own. previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor 
interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint 
actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated 
components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be 
represented in relation to distinct, incongruent proximal goals. instead they can be represented in 
relation to a single proximal goal – especially if the movements are, or appear to be, mechanically 
linked to a more distal joint action goal. To test this, we implemented a paradigm in which participants 
produced finger movements that were either congruent or incongruent with those of a virtual partner, 
and either with or without a joint action goal (the joint flipping of a switch, which turned on two light 
bulbs). Our findings provide partial support for the hypothesis that visuomotor interference effects can 
be reduced when two physically incongruent actions are represented as mechanically interdependent 
contributions to a joint action goal.
From handshakes to music-making, dance and team sports, social interactions often require an efficient means of 
tracking others’ actions while simultaneously planning and executing actions of one’s own1. A basketball player, 
for example, must monitor and anticipate her teammate’s movements in order to successfully contribute to a pick 
and roll play.
Given the broad range of social interactions in which it is important to anticipate, monitor and respond to 
others’ actions, it is no surprise that a considerable amount of research has been devoted to investigating how we 
achieve this2–5. An influential idea that has emerged is that the representation of others’ actions is often supported 
by one’s own motor system, implying that representations of others’ actions are often functionally equivalent to 
the representations involved in action production2–4,6,7. As a result, the observation of others’ actions can result in 
action representations that do not clearly distinguish self from other8–10.
An upshot is that the observation of others’ actions can give rise to representations that interfere with one’s 
own task performance. In a striking illustration of this, Brass et al.2 found that participants who were instructed 
to produce finger movements in response to symbolic cues responded more quickly when simultaneously observ-
ing irrelevant finger movements that were physically congruent to the ones they were instructed to produce, and 
more slowly when simultaneously observing irrelevant finger movements that were physically incongruent to 
these. These findings – and others that build on them11–13 – are taken to indicate that, when observing others’ 
actions, we automatically represent those actions using motor representations of the same type as those subserv-
ing action production.
This neatly explains why the observation of congruent actions facilitates task performance, while the obser-
vation of incongruent actions leads to visuomotor interference effects. However, it also raises a challenge. This 
is because many joint actions require individuals to produce physically incongruent yet complementary actions14. 
1Department of Philosophy, York University, S900 Ross Building, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, 
Canada. 2Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Október 6. u. 7, Budapest, 1051, Hungary. 
3Department of Philosophy, The University of Warwick, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK. *email: 
spclarke@yorku.ca
open
2Scientific RepoRtS |         (2019) 9:15414  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-52124-6
www.nature.com/scientificreportswww.nature.com/scientificreports/
A proficient basketball player, for example, may need to coordinate her movement towards the basket with her 
teammate’s passing of the ball. But if tracking her teammate’s action elicits motor representations that compete 
with those underpinning the action she herself must perform, then they may interfere with her own action prepa-
ration. In more general terms: where the tracking of others’ actions involves motor representations that are func-
tionally equivalent to the representations underpinning action production, this could give rise to interference 
effects and prove counter-productive in many cases of joint action.
This problem can, however, be overcome. In a recent paper by Sacheli, Arcangeli, & Paulesu15 participants 
played learned melodies with, or merely alongside, a virtual partner. In both cases, this required them to sequen-
tially produce actions that were either physically congruent (e.g. point-point) or physically incongruent to those 
that had just been produced by the partner (e.g. point-grasp). When participants and their partners performed 
these actions alongside one another (i.e. in a Non-Interactive Condition) performance was affected by the phys-
ical (in)congruence of the movements, as expected. But, when these actions were directed towards a joint action 
goal (i.e. the joint production of a single melody in a Joint Action Condition), physical congruence became irrel-
evant: task performance was affected by a reversal in movement-note associations, but not by the congruence or 
incongruence of the two agents’ movements. This raises the question: why would doing something in the context 
of a joint action eliminate interference from the perception of incongruent movements but create interference 
from the perception of anomalous sounds?
Sacheli et al.’s proposed answer is that the representation of a joint action goal enables joint action partners 
to integrate representations of their own and their partner’s actions within a single dyadic (multi-person) motor 
plan15. As they put it, this dyadic motor plan enables agent’s to select appropriate responses to their partner’s 
actions on the basis of their predicted outcomes (e.g. the production of a musical note). This explains why anoma-
lous movement-note associations would have generated interference in their study. However, it does not appear to 
explain why the joint action frame would have reduced interference from physically incongruent movements. In 
principle, integrating representations of incongruent movements within a larger motor plan could have increased 
interference effects instead16.
One possibility, left open by the aforementioned study, is that a joint action frame may lead participants to rep-
resent their partner’s actions in relation to a more distal joint action goal (i.e. a string of musical notes) instead of 
the more proximal goals that bring this about (i.e. grasping or pointing). In cases where the physical incongruence 
of the actions only obtains at the level of these more proximal goals, this might allow agents to bypass the rep-
resentation of their partners’ physically incongruent movements altogether, reducing or eliminating visuomotor 
interference effects (See Fig. 1). The trouble is: there seem to be cases of joint action where it is not sufficient to 
bypass the representation of a partner’s proximal goal altogether and to merely consider the more distal outcome 
of the joint action goal. Rather, as illustrated by the basketball players mentioned above, it is often necessary to 
represent the more proximal goals of a partner’s action in order to select actions that would complement these 
Figure 1. Two physically incongruent actions become part of a larger Joint Action plan. If there is no need 
to represent the other partner’s incongruent action (i.e. if the agent can produce their contribution to the 
joint action without taking their partner’s behaviour into account), then this may allow agents to bypass the 
representation of a partner’s actions altogether, allowing interference effects to be reduced or avoided. However, 
when one agent has to select an action based on which action their partner performs, their individual action 
cannot be represented only in terms of the more distal joint action or its goal.
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with respect to the more distal joint action goal. Indeed, this can be true of even the most basic motor movements 
involved. Thus, basic questions remain. Specifically: can the introduction of a distal joint action goal reduce visuo-
motor interference effects in cases where incongruent proximal goals are contingently related to one another, and 
attention to these is required for the selection of appropriate motor movements? And, if so, how might this be 
achieved?
In addressing the latter question, a natural starting point is the observation that action production typically 
involves the simultaneous representation of multiple, instrumentally related actions at multiple, instrumentally 
related levels of abstraction17–20. For example, we represent the action of turning the steering wheel not only at the 
level of the comparably distal goal (turned steering wheel) but also at the level of comparatively proximal goals, 
designed to bring this about (e.g. raised left arm; lowered right arm). Importantly, this hierarchical structure must 
capture instrumental relations between these different goals. Plainly, proximal goals must function to bring about 
comparatively distal goals. But, in addition to this, the comparatively proximal goals must (themselves) be sensi-
tive to each other such that a modification to one will lead others to change appropriately. For instance, one need 
not bother moving one’s arms if one is no longer grasping the wheel; and even when one is grasping the wheel, it 
may be no use raising one’s left arm if one does not simultaneously lower one’s right arm.
Here, the individual agent must simultaneously produce physically incongruent movements (arm lifting and 
arm lowering). But, in this case, it is not possible to avoid motoric interference by simply considering each arm’s 
movement independently of the other, or by simply considering the more distal goal outcome to which these are 
both directed (a turned wheel). This is because all of these goals are interrelated. Thus, the introduction of the 
more distal goal must change the way in which the more proximal goals are represented. Specifically, it must lead 
to their representation as interrelated, and not simply independent contributions to a larger action.
This raises the possibility that the actions of our joint action partners can be represented in relation to the 
same action hierarchy (See Fig. 2). Here, the introduction of a comparably distal joint action goal might enable 
the physically incongruent movements of self and other to be represented as interrelated components of a plan to 
bring about the joint action goal. If this is possible, then it might reduce or even eliminate interference from the 
observation of a partner’s physically incongruent movements, even when success in joint action requires one’s 
selective response to these. Thus, we hypothesise that where agents represent their actions as interrelated com-
ponents of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not always be represented in 
relation to distinct, incongruent proximal goals. Instead, they might be represented as interrelated contributions 
to a single goal. If true, the joint action frame could potentially reduce or even eliminate visuomotor interference 
effects arising from the observation of what an outsider might take to be a physically incongruent action.
To test this, we adapted Brass and colleagues’12 paradigm to incorporate a joint action goal, namely turning on 
two light bulbs by jointly flicking a switch. Here, participants were required to perform one of two finger-lifting 
movements depending on which numerical cue was presented on a screen, in between a virtual partner’s index 
and middle fingers (See Fig. 3). These movements could be physically congruent or physically incongruent with 
a movement performed by the virtual partner. In a Joint Action Goal Condition, lightbulbs were turned on when 
the participant and the partner simultaneously performed physically incongruent actions, but not when they 
performed physically congruent actions (something about which our hypothesis makes no predictions). In the 
Individual Goal Condition, the lights were never turned on (i.e. there was no joint action goal). We reasoned that 
if participants are able to utilize the joint action goal (turning on the lightbulbs) to represent a planning struc-
ture in which their partner’s movement forms a complementary and mutually interrelated contribution, then 
the physical incongruence of their own and the partner’s movement should be less relevant. This generates the 
Figure 2. Where one agent has to select an action based on which action the other performs, interference 
effects may be reduced if the agent can represent both actions as interrelated components of a single goal and 
not only in terms of the more distal goal (e.g. passing the ball, in a pick and roll play).
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prediction that we should observe reduced visuomotor interference effects in the Joint Action Goal Condition 
compared to the Individual Goal Condition. In other words, the difference in response times between Congruent 
trials (wherein the participant and the partner lift the same fingers) and Incongruent trials (wherein the par-
ticipant and the partner lift different fingers) should be smaller in the Joint Action Goal Conditions than in the 
Individual Goal Condition.
The predictions, sample size, methods, and planned analyses were all pre-registered before data collection and 
can be accessed at: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=cr4cg2. Unless otherwise noted, we implemented all steps 
as pre-registered.
Results
To control for speed-accuracy tradeoffs, reaction time (RT) for correct responses and hit rates (HR) were merged 
into inverse efficiency scores (IES), a combined measure which homogenizes different patterns of speed-accuracy 
trade-offs (IES)21, by dividing RTs by accuracy for each condition in each group (lower scores mean more efficient 
responses). We also analyzed the participants’ RT’s.
For the IES, we conducted a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with Jointness (Joint vs Individual Action Goal) and 
Congruence (Congruent vs Incongruent) as within participants factors, and Group (Joint First, Joint Last) as 
a between participants factor. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Congruence F(1,70) = 44.41, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.39, with lower IES in the Congruent condition, (M = 1168.67, SD = 211.75) than in the 
Incongruent condition (M = 1243.39, SD = 230.94); but no significant main effect of Jointness, F(1,70) = 0.49, 
p = 0.48, ηp2 = 0.007, and no significant main effect of Group F(1,70) = 1.72, p = 0.19, ηp2 = 0.02. There was 
no significant interaction between Jointness and Congruence, F (1,70) = 0.05 p = 0.82, ηp2 = 0.001, no signifi-
cant interaction between Congruence and Group, F(1,70) = 3.68, p = 0.06, ηp2 = 0.05 (although this was close 
to significance, we cannot make conclusions on the basis of this statistic), but a significant interaction between 
Jointness and Group, F(1,70) = 9.61, p = 0.003, ηp2 = 0.12. There was also a three way interaction between 
Jointness, Group and Congruence, F(1,70) = 14.49, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.17 (see Fig. 4).
Post-hoc t-tests for the Joint First Group revealed IES did not differ between congruent and incongruent trials 
for the Individual Goal condition, t(35) = −1.99, p = 0.054, d = −0.33 but IES were significantly lower for con-
gruent trials than incongruent trials for the Joint Goal condition, t(35) = −4.89, p < 0.001, d = −0.82. Congruent 
trials’ IES in the Individual Goal condition were not significantly different from congruent trials’ IES in the Joint 
Goal condition t(35) = −0.55, p = 0.59, d = −0.09 and incongruent trials’ IES in the Individual Goal condition 
were not significantly different from incongruent trials’ IES in the Joint Goal condition, t(35) = −1.93, p = 0.06, 
d = −0.32.
Post-hoc t-tests for the Joint Last Group revealed that congruent IES were significantly lower than incongruent 
trials’ IES for the Individual Goal condition, t(35) = −5.25, p < 0.001, d = −0.88 and congruent trials’ IES were 
significantly lower than incongruent trials’ IES for the Joint Goal condition, t(35) = −3.43, p = 0.002, d = −0.57. 
Congruent trials’ IES in the Joint Goal condition were not different from congruent trials’ IES in the Individual 
Goal condition, t(35) = 2.05, p = 0.05, d = 0.34, however incongruent trials’ IES in the Joint Goal condition were 
significantly lower than incongruent trials’ IES in the Individual Goal condition, t(35) = 3.98, p < 0.001, d = 0.66.
Figure 3. Illustration of the task. Participants were instructed to lift the same finger as the hand in the video 
when a ‘1’ is displayed (Congruent Condition) and to lift the other finger when a ‘2’ is displayed (Incongruent 
Condition). The left side illustrates the Individual Goal Condition, in which the lights never turn on. The right 
side illustrates the Joint Action Goal Condition, in which the lights are turned on when two conditions are 
fulfilled: the number cue (‘2’) indicates that the participant should perform the ‘incongruent’ action, and the 
participant correctly does so.
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We believe that the three-way interaction was likely the result of the incongruent trials causing comparatively 
little visuomotor interference in the first block of trials when there was a Joint Action Goal, compared to when 
there was not a Joint Action Goal. To further investigate the three-way interaction, we subtracted the IES of con-
gruent trials from the IES of incongruent trials (IES difference) for each participant, for each condition, giving us 
an index of how much the incongruent trials interfered with participants’ responses in each of the conditions. We 
conducted a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA, with Jointness as a within participants factor, and Group as a between partici-
pants factor, which revealed no main effect of Jointness, F(1,70) = 0.05, p = 0.82, ηp2 = 0.001, and no main effect 
of Group, F(1,70) = 3.69 p = 0.06, ηp2 = 0.05 (although this is close to significance, it does not permit us to draw 
any conclusions). However, there was an interaction between Jointness and Group, F(1,70) = 14.49, p < 0.001, 
ηp2 = 0.17 (see Fig. 5). Bonferroni corrected post-hoc t-tests revealed that Joint Action Goal IES differences 
were significantly larger than Individual Goal IES differences for the Joint First group, t(35) = −2.64, p = 0.012, 
d = −0.44, and Joint Action Goal IES differences were significantly smaller than Individual Goal IES differences 
for the Joint Last Group, t(35) = 2.74, p = 0.01, d = 0.46. There was no significant difference between the Joint 
First group and Joint Last group for Joint Action Goal Trials, t(70) = 0.43, p = 0.67, d = 0.1, but Joint First IES 
differences were significantly smaller than Joint Last IES differences for Individual Goal trials, t(70) = −3.51, 
p < 0.001, d = 0.83.
Figure 4. 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA. Mean Inverse Efficiency Scores (IES) are plotted separately for Congruent and 
Incongruent trials in the Joint Action Goal and the Individual Goal Conditions, for each group. Error bars 
represent the within-subject confidence intervals29,30.
Figure 5. 2 × 2 ANOVA. Mean difference between Congruent and Incongruent Inverse Efficiency Scores (IES) 
for Joint Action Goal and the Individual Goal Conditions, for each group. Error bars represent the within-
subject confidence intervals29,30.
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Discussion
Our results revealed a three-way interaction of Congruence, Jointness and Group. In the group which performed 
the Joint Action Goal Condition last, the difference between congruent and incongruent trials was significantly 
smaller when there was a joint action goal than when there was none. In the group which performed the Joint 
Action Goal Condition first, in contrast, the difference between congruent and incongruent trials was signifi-
cantly greater when there was a joint action goal than when there was none.
The results from the group which performed the Joint Action Goal Condition last indicate that a joint action 
goal representation may, as we predicted, reduce visuomotor interference effects arising from the observation of 
a physically incongruent action. These results build upon earlier research indicating that the visuomotor interfer-
ence effects arising from the perception of a virtual partner’s physically incongruent movement can be reduced 
when two physically incongruent movements are represented as complementary contributions to a joint action 
goal15,22. Our results extend this research by suggesting that a joint action goal representation can reduce visuo-
motor interference effects even when agents must detect a joint action partner’s physically incongruent movement 
while simultaneously producing actions that are contingently related to these. This supports the hypothesis that 
where agents represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, the 
movements of each partner’s effectors need not always be represented in relation to distinct, incongruent proxi-
mal goals. Instead they can be represented as interrelated contributions to a single goal – especially if the move-
ments are, or appear to be, mechanically linked to a more distal joint action goal.
The results from the group which performed the Joint Action Goal Condition first, in contrast, are not consist-
ent with our prediction. For this group, the joint action framing did not lead to a reduction of visuomotor inter-
ference effects. Indeed, the difference in performance between congruent and incongruent trials was significantly 
larger in the Joint Action Goal condition than in the Individual Goal condition for this group. This pattern may be 
partially be attributed to a carryover effect: having completed the Joint Action Goal Condition first, participants 
in this group may have continued representing incongruent trials as contributing towards a joint action goal, even 
once this goal (turning on lightbulbs) had been removed. This conjecture would explain why, for participants in 
this group, performance on incongruent trials did not worsen from the first block (Joint Action Goal Condition) 
to the second block (Individual Goal Condition). However, it does not explain why performance on congruent 
trials did worsen slightly from the first block (Joint Action Goal Condition) to the second block (Individual Goal 
Condition). We might speculate that this was due to fatigue: it may have been difficult to maintain the high level of 
performance that we observed in this group on congruent trials in the first block (Joint Action Goal Condition).
The mixed pattern of results between our two groups underscores the broader point that we should not expect 
the introduction of a joint action goal representation to always eliminate or reduce visuomotor interference effects 
arising from the concurrent performance and perception of physically incongruent actions. And indeed, there 
is evidence that it does not always do so. For instance, it has been shown that under certain circumstances joint 
action goal representations can lead to an increase in this form of interference. In one study16, participants were 
instructed to draw either circles or straight vertical lines on tablet screens resting on a table in front of them while 
a second participant, sitting diagonally across from them, performed the other (i.e. incongruent) action. On a 
screen directly in front of each participant, they could see the outcome of their partner’s action (i.e. a straight line 
or a circle appearing on the screen). One group of participants (the Joint Action Condition) were informed that, 
together, their own and their partner’s drawings constituted complementary components of a single drawing. A 
second group of participants (the Parallel Condition) were informed that the other agent’s action was irrelevant 
to their own task. Within this setup, the joint action goal (i.e. in the Joint Action condition) led to an increase in 
interference effects. If our hypothesis is correct, this finding is not surprising: since participants did not have to 
identify their partner’s movement in order to select their own movement, and since they were unable to see the 
outcome of their combined efforts, they did not perceive their own and their partner’s actions as mechanically 
linked to a more distal joint action goal. Thus, participants simply represented their own and their partner’s move-
ments in relation to distinct and incongruent proximal goals.
This would be consistent with research showing the facilitatory effects of Lissajous plots on bimanual coordi-
nation23,24. In this research, participants are instructed to perform two separate rhythmic actions, one with each 
hand. Lissajous plots are used to display the location of one limb on the x-axis, and the location of the other limb 
on the y-axis, as well as the location of a dot integrating the locations of the two hands. This visual feedback ena-
bles participants to represent the two hand movements as mechanically linked to a single, combined outcome. As 
a result, they are able to maintain otherwise unstable phase relations25,26.
It would be important for future research to investigate other contexts in which individuals must efficiently 
represent and respond to others’ physically incongruent actions. In particular, it would be valuable to probe 
competitive scenarios in which there are no joint action goals but in which the outcomes of two agents’ are 
interdependent and to investigate the extent to which the representation of a partner’s actions can be modulated 
by the degree of coordination required by a joint action goal. Future research should also investigate the neu-
ral mechanisms that underpin the integration of physically incongruent actions into unified motor plans. One 
important starting point in this respect is provided Sacheli, Tieri, Aglioti, & Candidi’s22 study demonstrating that 
virtual lesions (created using continuous theta-burst stimulation) in the left anterior intraparietal sulcus led to 
an increase in visuomotor interference effects in a scenario in which participants observed a partner’s action and 
were required to select a physically incongruent action to perform synchronously.
Methods
participants. Using G∗Power 3.127 we determined that a sample size of thirty would provide 80% statistical 
power for detecting a small-to-medium-sized effect of the interaction of the two main factors, Jointness (Joint 
Action Goal vs Individual Goal) and Congruence (Congruent vs Incongruent), assuming a two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA and an alpha level of 0.05. We therefore recruited 30 participants. Because of the high exclusion 
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rate in this initial data collection, we had to recruit more participants to replace those who had been excluded, 
and overestimated the number of participants needed to compensate for exclusions. This resulted in a total of 36 
participants. Due to experimenter error, all of these 36 participants were administered the Joint Last condition, so 
we then collected 36 participants for the Joint First group to counterbalance.
Thus, our sample included 72 participants (13 females; age range: 21–46, M = 27.1, SD = 4.77). All partici-
pants were recruited from student organizations in the Budapest and Warwick areas, were naïve to the purpose 
of the study, and reported normal or corrected to normal vision. All participants signed informed consent prior 
to the experiment, and received gift vouchers or money for their participation. The experiment was conducted in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the (EPKEB) United Ethical Review Board for 
Research in Psychology.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was displayed on a 13-inch computer screen (resolution: 
2560 × 1600 pixels, refresh rate: 60 Hz). The program for the experiment was written in OpenSesame Python28, 
with a frame rate of 17 frames per second. Figure 3 illustrates the task environment.
procedure. After giving their informed written consent, participants were seated alone at a desk in a lab room 
and provided with further instructions, after which they had the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions to the 
experimenter.
They then performed two test blocks (Joint Action Goal Condition and Individual Action Goal Condition) 
consisting of 80 trials each (40 Congruent, 40 Incongruent; 20 of each required index finger movements and 20 
middle finger movements). Each test block was preceded by 4 practice trials (i.e. 8 in total). The order of test 
blocks was counterbalanced across participants; Incongruent and Congruent trials were evenly distributed across 
blocks and randomly mixed within each block.
At the beginning of each trial, participants were instructed to hold down the left and right buttons of the 
mouse with the index and middle fingers of their right hand. The stimuli were short video sequences of simple 
finger movements (lifting), as illustrated in Fig. 3. Then a picture of the hand was presented for 2000 ms with a 
number displayed between the index and middle finger, indicating the participant’s instruction for that trial: the 
participant was instructed to lift the same finger as her/his virtual partner on trials in which a ‘1’ was displayed 
below the picture of the hand (Congruent trials), and to lift the other finger on trials in which the number ‘2’ was 
displayed (Incongruent trials). Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible as 
soon as the virtual partner’s finger began to move. Next, a still frame of the virtual partner’s hand was displayed 
with the index or the middle finger having been lifted. The onset of this image was the participant’s go-signal to 
lift the appropriate finger.
In the Individual Action Goal Condition, the two light bulbs were displayed on the two sides of the screen (See 
Fig. 3) during all trials, but remained switched off at all times.
In the Joint Action Goal Condition, the instructions were the same as in the Individual Action Goal Condition 
except that participants were informed there would sometimes be a ‘bonus’ effect: when the participant and her/
his partner correctly lifted different fingers (i.e. this was only possible on incongruent trials), they would jointly 
flip the switch, causing the lights to be switched on (See Fig. 3). Participants were explicitly informed that this 
could happen only on the trials in which the correct response was to perform the incongruent action.
At the end of each trial, the scene was displayed for 2000 ms. When the switch was flipped and the lightbulbs 
turned on, the scene was displayed with the switch having been flipped and the lightbulbs turned on. On trials 
when participants performed the incorrect action, the background turned red and the scene was displayed, oth-
erwise unchanged, for 2000 ms. On trials when participants performed the correct action but the switch was not 
flipped and the lightbulbs not turned on, the scene was displayed just as in the previous frame.
Data processing and analysis. For the analysis, we had several exclusion criteria. Firstly, we excluded four 
participants (three in the Joint First Group and one in the Joint Last Group) from all of our analysis as they had 
an unusually high rate of premature responses (all > 90%), meaning that it is likely that they did not understand 
the instructions and that their data cannot be relied on. Secondly, we excluded any participants with an overall 
accuracy more than 2.5 SD below the group mean (either Joint First group or Joint Last group) from all our 
analyses, as their data is likely unreliable. This resulted in the exclusion of 480 trials (7.6%) or 3 participants from 
the Joint First group, and 480 trials (7.6%) or 3 participants from the Joint Last group. Secondly, we excluded 
72 (1.1%) premature responses (responses before the stimulus onset) from the Joint First group, and 58 (0.9%) 
premature responses from the Joint Last group, from all of our analysis. Thirdly, 147 (2.3%) trials with RTs more 
than 2.5 standard deviations (SDs) removed from the mean (calculated for each participant for each condition) 
were excluded from the Joint First group, and 128 trials (2.1%) were excluded from the Joint Last group. Finally, 
240 trials (3.9%) incorrect responses for the Joint First group, and 297 trials (4.7%) from the Joint Last group were 
excluded from the RTs. Although these criteria were not pre-registered, we determined to apply them prior to 
analysing any data. Our rationale was that the hypothesis being tested pertained to the processes engaged when 
people perform actions while perceiving a physically incongruent action from a joint action partner; on trials 
on which participants committed errors, we could not be confident that these processes were actually engaged.
For each participant, we calculated the mean RT’s and accuracy (proportion correct), for congruent and 
incongruent trials for each condition (see Supplementary File for means per condition). We divided the RTs by 
the accuracy in order to compute Inverse Efficiency Scores (IES)21 as an index of efficiency, appropriately weight-
ing speed and accuracy.
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